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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and effi-
ciency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness,
anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also
give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule,
as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare
and budget-balance.
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1 Introduction
We consider the situations as follows. There are one service (banking, postal,
phone, web server, etc.) and money. Agents want to use the service, but no
two agents can be served simultaneously. Each agent’s serving time is the
same, and normalized to unity. Each agent has a constant unit waiting cost
which may differ among agents, and his waiting cost is the product of his
waiting times and his unit waiting cost. Although agents must wait their
turns, they have high values for use enough to do so. To compensate the
waiting agents, monetary transfers are possible. The queueing problems are
concerned with what the orders and the monetary transfers we select for each
unit waiting costs of agents.1 A rule is formulated as a function assigning a
pair of queue and monetary transfers to agents’ unit waiting costs.
In the most previous literature analyzing the queueing problems, effi-
ciency has been focused on mainly. A rule is queue-efficient if the total
waiting cost among agents is minimized. While queue-efficiency concerns effi-
ciency for queues, budget-balance (the sum of transfers is zero) does efficiency
for transfers. Queue-efficiency combined with budget-balance is equivalent
to Pareto-efficiency.
The literature are divided into two groups; one has the cooperative game
approach and another has the non-cooperative game approach. In the co-
operative game approach, Maniquet (2003) has constructed a transferable
utility game from the queueing problem and defined the rule which assigns
the Shapley value to the agents’ final utility. He has characterized the rule
with Pareto-efficiency and auxiliary axioms. Chun (2006a) has constructed a
different transferable utility game, and defined and characterized the Shapley
value rule corresponding to the game. As literature that have considered the
rules using other cooperative game solutions, Katta and Sethuraman (mimeo)
and Kar et al. (mimeo) have analyzed the core rule and the prenucleous rule,
respectively.
In the non-cooperative game approach, Dolan (1978) has provided a rule
that satisfies queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness is
the condition that it is a dominant strategy for any agent to report his true
cost, i.e., it prevents agents from manipulating strategically. While Dolan’s
(1978) rule does not satisfy budget-balance, the equally distributed pairwise
pivotal rule2 proposed by Suijs (1996) satisfies not only strategy-proofness
and queue-efficiency but also budget-balance (that is, Pareto-efficiency).3
1In concluding remarks, we will give other problems which have the same structure as
the queueing problems.
2This name has been given by Kayı and Ramaekers (mimeo).
3Mitra and Mutuswami (mimeo) has characterized the class of rules that satisfy
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Moreover, this rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and equal treatment of equals in welfare [Kayı and Ramaekers
(mimeo)]. Equal treatment of equals in welfare requires that the rule assign
an allocation for which the welfare levels of agents are equal, as long as their
unit waiting costs are the same.
In both approaches, the authors have analyzed the efficient rules mainly.
However, agents may not care about anything but equity. In such environ-
ments, an equitable rule is desirable from agents’ point of view, although
efficiency is a goal of the whole society. Anonymity in welfare is a condition
of equity4 in the sense that the names of the agents do not matter in the
rule from the viewpoint of welfare level. Anonymity in welfare requires that
when the unit waiting costs of two agents are switched, their welfare under
the rule be also switched. In this paper, we consider a relationship between
equity and efficiency, and show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in
welfare implies queue-efficiency. Therefore, a rule automatically achieves the
whole society’s goal, as long as it pursues agents’ concern. Furthermore, we
also give another characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal
rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare
and budget-balance.
In an auction model, the Vickrey allocation rule is the only rule that
satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and auxiliary axioms [Ser-
izawa (2006)]. Although queueing model can also be considered as an auction
model, there is a crucial difference between Serizawa (2006) and ours. While
Serizawa (2006) has researched a homogeneous goods model, queueing model
corresponds to a heterogeneous goods model. Thus, both results are inde-
pendent.
In Section 2, we set up the model and state the results. In Section 3, we
provide proofs. Finally, in Section 4 we make some concluding remarks.
2 The model and the result
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents. An n-tuple σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Nn
is a queue if σi = σj for all i, j ∈ N with i = j. Each agent i ∈ N is assigned
a position σi in a queue σ and a monetary transfer ti ∈ R. Each agent i ∈ N
has quasi-linear preferences on X ≡ N ×R, i.e., if agent i’s unit waiting cost
is ci ∈ R+, then his preference is represented by ui(σi, ti; ci) = −(σi−1)ci+ti.
strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency.
4Envy-freeness is also well-known as a condition of equity. Envy-freeness requires that
no agent should end up with a higher utility by consuming what any other agent consumes.
Chun (2006b) and Kayı and Ramaekers (mimeo) have analyzed the envy-free rules.
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A list c ≡ (ci)i∈N ∈ Rn+ is a cost profile. Let C ≡Rn+ be the set of cost
profiles. Let Z ≡ {(σ, t) ≡ (σi, ti)i∈N ∈ Xn : (a) σ is a queue and (b)∑
i∈N ti ≤ 0} be the set of feasible allocations. A rule is a function f from C
to Z.
We consider rules satisfying the following conditions.
Definition 1 A rule f is strategy-proof if for all c ∈ C, all i ∈ N and all c′i,
ui(fi(c); ci) ≥ ui(fi(c′i, c−i); ci).
This is an incentive compatible condition that it is a dominant strategy
for any agent to report his true unit waiting cost.
Next, we introduce two conditions of equity.
Definition 2 A rule f is anonymous in welfare if for all c ∈ C and all
i, j ∈ N , ui(fi(c); ci) = ui(fj(c′i, c′j , c−{i,j}); ci), where c′i = cj and c′j = ci.
This condition says that when the unit waiting costs of two agents are
switched, their welfare under the rule are also switched.5 Under this condi-
tion, the names of the agents do not matter from the viewpoint of welfare
level.
Definition 3 A rule f satisfies equal treatment of equals in welfare if for all
c ∈ C and all i, j ∈ N with ci = cj , ui(fi(c); ci) = uj(fj(c); cj).
This condition says that the rule assigns allocations for which the welfare
levels of agents are equal, as long as their unit waiting costs are the same.
Note that anonymity in welfare implies equal treatment of equals in welfare.
Finally, we introduce conditions of efficiency.
Definition 4 A rule f is Pareto-efficient if for all c ∈ C, there is no z ∈ Z
such that ui(zi; ci) ≥ ui(fi(c); ci) for all i ∈ N and uj(zj; cj) > uj(fj(c); cj)
for some j ∈ N .
Pareto-efficiency is decomposable into two conditions of efficiency: queue-
efficiency (efficiency for queues) and budget balance (efficiency for transfers).
A queue σ is an efficient queue for c if
∑
i∈N(σi − 1)ci ≤
∑
i∈N(σ
′
i − 1)ci
for all queue σ′. Let Q∗(c) be the set of efficient queues for c. By definition,
5In divisible object models, such as exchange [Barbera` and Jackson (1995)] or allotment
[Sprumont (1991)] models, anonymity requires that two agents’ outcome are switched when
their preferences are switched. However, in indivisible object models, such as auction,
queueing or public decision models, any rule cannot satisfy this type of anonymity. Thus,
we need to impose the condition in terms of welfare instead of outcome [as Moulin (1986)
and Serizawa (2006)]. To distinguish these two conditions, we call the condition used in
this paper anonymity in welfare.
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σ ∈ Q∗(c) means that, under σ, the agents are served in decreasing order
with respect to c, i.e., σ ∈ Q∗(c) if and only if for each i, j ∈ N with i = j,
ci ≥ cj whenever σi < σj .
Definition 5 A rule f = (σ, t) is queue-efficient if for all c ∈ C, σ(c) ∈ Q∗(c).
Definition 6 A rule f = (σ, t) is budget-balanced if for all c ∈ C,∑i∈N ti(c) =
0.
The following theorem states the relationship between equity and effi-
ciency.
Theorem 1 If f = (σ, t) is strategy-proof and anonymous in welfare, then
it is queue-efficient.
The proof is in the next section.
Note that strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals in welfare do
not imply queue-efficiency. For example, let f = (σ, t) be such that for all
c ∈ C, σi(c) = i and ti(c) = −
∑
j =i(j − 1)cj. One can easily check that this
rule satisfies strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals but does not
satisfy queue-efficiency.6 Thus, anonymity in welfare is crucial in theorem 1.
Kayı and Ramaekers (2007) have characterized the rules satisfying strategy-
proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals in welfare. They
have shown that the only rule satisfying the three axioms is the equally dis-
tributed pairwise pivotal rule defined as follows.
Definition 7 A rule f = (σ, t) is the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule
if for each c ∈ C, σ(c) ∈ Q∗(c), and for each agent i ∈ N ,
ti(c) = −
∑
j =i
∑
∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ(c))
c +
1
n− 2
∑
j =i
∑
k =i,j
∑
∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ(c))
c,
where Fi(σ(c)) is the set of followers of agent i under σ(c).
We explain this rule with an example used by Kayı and Ramekers (2007).
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and c ∈ C be such that c1 > c2 > c3 >
c4. First, agents are served in decreasing order with repect to c, that is
σ(c) = (1, 2, 3, 4). Next, consider each pair of agents, and make each agent
6This example does not satisfy budget-balance. It is an open question whether or
not strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals in welfare, and budget-balance imply
queue-efficiency. In an auction model, Ando et al. (2008) have discussed a problem which
corresponds to it. However, they also do not have a general result.
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in the pair pay the cost that the agent imposes on another agent, that is, the
predecessor pays the unit waiting cost of the follower and the follower pays
nothing. Then, distribute the sum of these two payments equally among
the others. The final monetary transfer is the sum of all transfers for each
possible pair. The following table shows how payments are calculated.
1 2 3 4
12 −c2 0 c22 c22
13 −c3 c32 0 c32
14 −c4 c42 c42 0
23 c3
2
−c3 0 c32
24 c4
2
−c4 c42 0
34 c4
2
c4
2
−c4 0
sum −c2 − c32 − c32 c22 c22 + c3
One can check that the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule satisfies
anonymity in welfare. Furthermore, since anonymity in welfare implies equal
treatment of equals in welfare, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 A rule f is strategy-proof, anonymous in welfare and budget-
balanced if and only if it is the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule.
3 Proof
At first, we give some definitions (see Figure 1). Given c ∈ C, let
K1(c) ≡ {i ∈ N : ci > min
j∈N
cj},
K2(c) ≡ {i ∈ K1(c) : ci > min
j∈K1(c)
cj},
K3(c) ≡ {i ∈ K2(c) : ci > min
j∈K2(c)
cj}, and so on.
That is, K1(c) is the set of agents whose unit waiting costs are not minimal
in N , K2(c) is the set of agents in K1(c) whose unit waiting costs are not
minimal in K1(c), and so on.
Proof of Theorem. Suppose that f = (σ, t) is strategy-proof and anony-
mous in welfare. We will show that for all c ∈ C, σ(c) ∈ Q∗(c), that is, the
agents are served decreasing order with respect to c. First, we show that the
agents in K1(c) are served before the agents in N\K1(c).
Claim. For all c ∈ C and for all i ∈ K1(c), σi(c) ≤ #K1(c).
We prove by induction on the cardinality of K1(c) as follows.
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(A) For all c ∈ C with #K1(c) = 0, and for all i ∈ K1(c), σi(c) ≤ 0.
(B) If for all c ∈ C with #K1(c) = k1−1, and for all i ∈ K1(c), σi(c) ≤ k1−1,
then for all c ∈ C with #K1(c) = k1, and for all i ∈ K1(c), σi(c) ≤ k1.
Since #K1(c) = 0 is equivalent to K1(c) = ∅, (A) is obviously true. We have
only to show (B).
Let k1 be such that 1 ≤ k1 < n, and suppose that for all c ∈ C with
#K1(c) = k1−1, and for all i ∈ K1(c) σi(c) ≤ k1−1 . Let c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C
be such that #K1(c) = k1 and let i ∈ K1(c) be given. Let c′i ≡ minj∈N cj and
c′ ≡ (c′i, c−i). Since #K1(c′) = k1 − 1, the hypothesis of induction implies
that σh(c
′) ≤ k1− 1 for all h ∈ K1(c′). Thus, there exists j ∈ N\K1(c′) such
that σj(c
′) = k1. We divide the argument into two cases.
Case 1. j = i.
Strategy-proofness implies that
−(σi(c)− 1)ci + ti(c) ≥ −(k1 − 1)ci + ti(c′i) and
−(k1 − 1)c′i + ti(c′i) ≥ −(σi(c)− 1)c′i + ti(c).
These two inequalities then imply that
(σi(c)− k1)(c′i − ci) ≥ 0.
Since c′i − ci < 0, we must have σi(c)− k1 ≤ 0. Therefore, σi(c) ≤ k1.
Case 2. j = i (see Figure 2).
Let c′j ≡ ci and c′′ ≡ (c′i, c′j, c−{i,j}). Then it holds by anonymity in welfare
that
ui(fi(c); ci) = ui(fj(c
′′); ci) and ui(fi(c′); ci) = ui(fj(c′); ci),
that is,
−(σi(c)− 1)ci + ti(c) = −(σj(c′′)− 1)ci + tj(c′′) and
−(k1 − 1)c′i + tj(c′) = −(σi(c′)− 1)c′i + ti(c′).
They are equivalent to
ti(c) = (σi(c)− σj(c′′))ci + tj(c′′) and (1)
tj(c
′) = (k1 − σi(c′))c′i + ti(c′). (2)
By strategy-proofness, we also have
−(σj(c′′)− 1)c′j + tj(c′′) ≥ −(k1 − 1)c′j + tj(c′).
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This is equivalent to
tj(c
′′) ≥ (σj(c′′)− k1)c′j + tj(c′),
= (σj(c
′′)− k1)c′j + (k1 − σi(c′))c′i + ti(c′), (3)
where equality comes from (2). Strategy-proofness also implies that
−(σi(c′)− 1)c′i + ti(c′) ≥ −(σi(c)− 1)c′i + ti(c).
This is equivalent to
0 ≥ (σi(c′)− σi(c))c′i + ti(c)− ti(c′),
= (σi(c
′)− σi(c))c′i + [(σi(c)− σj(c′′))ci + tj(c′′)]− ti(c′),
≥ (σi(c′)− σi(c))c′i + (σi(c)− σj(c′′))ci
+ [(σj(c
′′)− k1)c′j + (k1 − σi(c′))c′i + ti(c′)]− ti(c′)
= (σi(c)− k1)(ci − c′i),
where the first equality comes from (1), the second inequality comes from
(3), and the second equality comes from c′j = ci. Since ci − c′i > 0, we must
have σi(c)− k1 ≤ 0. Therefore, σi(c) ≤ k1. 
By the claim, each agent in K1(c) is served before the agents in N\K1(c),
in other words, each agent in N\K1(c) is served after the agents in K1(c).
Since the unit waiting costs of the agents belonging to N\K1(c) are the same,
the orders of them are arbitrary for queue-efficiency. Thus, the remaining
problem to show queue-efficiency is that for all c ∈ C, the agents in K1(c)
are served decreasing order with respect to c.
By the same technique as the claim, we can show that for all c ∈ C, each
agent in K2(c) is served before the agents in K1(c)\K2(c), in other words,
each agent in K1(c)\K2(c) is served after the agents in K2(c) (and also before
the agents in N\K1(c)). Since the unit waiting costs of the agents belonging
to K1(c)\K2(c) are the same, the orders of them are arbitrary for queue-
efficiency. Thus, the remaining problem to show queue-efficiency is that for
all c ∈ C, the agents in K2(c) are served decreasing order with respect to c.
By continuing the same argument repeatedly at most n times, we can
show that for all c ∈ C, σ(c) ∈ Q∗(c). Q.E.D.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed a relationship between equity and efficiency,
and have shown that strategy-proofness and anonymity in welfare imply
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queue-efficiency. Agents are usually more concerned with equity than ef-
ficiency, while efficiency is the whole society’s goal. From our result, we can
say that a rule automatically achieves the whole society’s goal, as long as it
pursues agents’ concern. Furthermore, we have also given another character-
ization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that
satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance. By
this result, the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule is the best rule from
not only an efficient point of view, but also an equitable one.
In this paper, we have researched the queueing models with one service
and the same serving time. Recently, several authors have analyzed extended
models; Mitra (2005) and Chun and Heo (2007) have analyzed models with
multiple services and the same serving time, Mitra (2002), Chun (2004), and
Mishra and Rangarajan (2005) have analyzed models with one service and
different serving times. In these researches, efficiency has been focused on
mainly. It is a further research to analyze rules focused on equity mainly in
extended models.
There are many problems that have the same structure as the queueing
problems. Parking area problems and seat reservation problems are exam-
ples.
• Parking area problems: There are month-to-month parking spaces
which are in-line as viewed from the exit. Each agent wants to contract
one and only one parking space. The more distant from the exit, the
more costs agents have (imagine the cost as the distance or necessary
time from the parking space to the exit). How should we determine
the agents’ parking space and the monetary transfers among them?
• Seat reservation models: There is an event (concert, movie, sports,
etc.), and there are seats which are in-line as viewed from the stage.
Each agent wants to reserve one and only one seat. The more distant
from the stage, more costs agents have (imagine the cost as the disu-
tility). How should we determine the agents’ seats and the monetary
transfers among them?
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Figure 1: Illustration of K1(c), K2(c), and K3(c)
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